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INTRODUCTION

In law, as in life, relationships are everything.
As with all transformational laws, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act,1 hereinafter referred to by its popular
name, the Affordable Care Act (ACA or the Act), derives its
power from the extent to which it realigns prior relationships
and from adding new rights and duties: Between individuals
and government through the creation of a right to accessible,
affordable health insurance and a concomitant “personal
responsibility” to secure it;2 between the insurance industry

© 2014 Sara Rosenbaum
* Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor, Health Law and Policy, The George
Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services,
Washington D.C.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). The Obama Administration refers to these two
laws jointly as The Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., 78 Fed. Reg. 27,486 (May 10,
2013).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act sec. 1501, § 5000A, 124
Stat. at 244–50 (adding section 5000A to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986);
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and the government through reforms aimed at assuring access
to affordable coverage;3 between larger employers and workers
through the Act’s “shared responsibility” requirements;4 and
between health care providers and public and private insurers
through provisions aimed at long-term restructuring in how
health care is organized and paid for.5
But it is fair to say that no relationship within the health
care system is more affected by the Act than that between the
federal government and state governments. Indeed, the ACA
establishes a legal approach to national health reform that, at
its core, rests on the shoulders of this relationship. First, the
Act expands the pre-existing federal-state partnership in the
regulation of health insurance while establishing a new
Marketplace for affordable coverage.6 Second, the Act expands
the joint federal-state investment in health care for the poor
(this time, with the lion’s share coming from the federal
partner) through an expanded Medicaid program.7 As of May
2013, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated
that by 2022, twenty-five million Americans will gain coverage
as a result of this recalibrated set of relationships.8
see §1401, 124 Stat. at 213–20 (establishing a legal entitlement on the part of
qualified individuals to advanced premium tax credits by amending chapter 1
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); §1402, 124 Stat. at 220–24 (adding an
entitlement to cost-sharing reduction assistance in the case of eligible
individuals).
3. § 1001, 124 Stat. at 130–38 (amending the Public Health Service Act
(PHSA)); § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154–61 (same); § 1562(e), 124 Stat. at 270
(amending the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to
apply certain PHSA insurance reforms to ERISA plans).
4. § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253–56 (amending chapter 43 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 to add a shared employer responsibility to contribute
toward the cost of coverage in certain cases).
5. See, e.g., § 3021, 124 Stat. at 389–95 (establishing the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation); § 3022, 124 Stat. at 395–99 (establishing
the Medicare Shared Savings Program); § 3023, 124 Stat. at 399–403
(establishing a national pilot program on payment bundling); § 3025, 124 Stat.
at 408–13 (establishing a readmissions reduction program).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. The CBO’s original cost estimates associated with the Act put the
total number of newly insured Americans at thirty-one million. Letter from
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to the Honorable Harry
Reid, U.S. Senate Majority Leader, tbl.3 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11307/reid_lett
er_hr3590.pdf (estimating a reduction of thirty-one million uninsured
nonelderly people by 2019). Following the United States Supreme Court’s
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Of course, to achieve the Act’s intended effects, these
legislative relationships actually need to become operational.
But as of spring 2013, the political animus that pervaded the
country, coupled with the near mortal blow dealt to the Act’s
structure by the United States Supreme Court’s Medicaid
ruling in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius (NFIB),9 placed half of all states on track to refuse to
either implement their own Health Insurance Marketplaces10
or adopt the Medicaid coverage expansions for poor adults.11
Moreover, the vast majority of states had not yet taken steps to
implement the far-reaching insurance reforms specified under
the Act; indeed, as of the winter of 2013, only one state had
done so.12

decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 32 S. Ct.
2566 (2012), the CBO revised this figure down to about thirty million as a
result of the Court’s holding that states could opt out of the mandatory 2014
Medicaid adult expansion. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE
INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED
FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 20 tbl.3 (2012) [hereinafter CBO
ESTIMATES],
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf. In May 2013, the CBO
further revised the figure down to twenty-five million by 2022 as a result of
new estimates lowering the number of individuals with employer health
insurance. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 tbl.1 (2013),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44190_
EffectsAffordableCareActHealthInsuranceCoverage_2.pdf.
9. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–09 (2012) (holding that the Medicaid expansion
was optional, not mandatory, for states).
10. Health Insurance Marketplaces are also known as the American
Health Benefit Exchanges under the ACA. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act § 1311, 124 Stat. at 173–81. In 2012, the Obama
Administration introduced the term “Health Insurance Marketplace” in order
to make the concept more understandable to the public, most of whom had
absolutely no idea what an Exchange was. See, e.g., Press Release, President
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Supreme Court Ruling on the
Affordable Care Act (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2012/06/28/remarks-president-supreme-court-rulingaffordable-care-act.
11. See supra note 9.
12. KATIE KEITH ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: STATE ACTION ON THE 2014 MARKET REFORMS 2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/
Publications/Issue%20Brief/2013/1662_Keith_implementing_ACA_state_actio
n_2014_reform_brief_v2.pdf (finding that only one state had implemented all
seven 2014 market reforms as of October 2012).
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The pressure on Republican state leaders to resist any sort
of accommodation to the Act is intense,13 with unending
polemics against cooperation delivered by its ideological
opponents,14 as well as repeated, hammering blows against any
move toward cooperative federalism administered by the
Republican-controlled United States House of Representatives.
By May 2013, the House had voted thirty-seven separate times
to repeal the Act in its entirety.15 These intense and
unrelenting attacks in turn appear to be having their intended
effect, helping push over two dozen states by mid-2013 to act

13. See, e.g., Sandhya Somashekhar, GOP Governors’ Endorsements of
Medicaid Expansion Deepen Rifts Within Party, WASH. POST, June 3, 2013,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-02/national/39697956_1_medicaidexpansion-medicaid-plan-gop-governors.
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL F. CANNON, CATO INST., 50 VETOES: HOW STATES
CAN STOP THE OBAMA HEALTH CARE LAW (2013), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/50-vetoes-white-paper_1.pdf.
Perhaps the most thorough documentation of how the Act’s opponents have
turned its federalism structure into a potent weapon against itself can be
found in 50 Vetoes, which focuses on how states can stop the ACA from taking
effect by refusing to expand Medicaid and by refusing to establish Health
Insurance Marketplaces (the newest term for what are known as “exchanges”
under the Act). Id. One might wonder why stopping states from establishing
their own Marketplaces would undermine the Act, since as discussed later in
this article, the law provides for default federal administration of the new
Marketplace system in any state that elects not to operate its own. See infra
notes 62–87 and accompanying text. The answer lies in a companion legal
theory, now working its way through the courts, that the Act’s terms prohibit
federally facilitated Marketplaces (as they are known) from offering premium
subsidies to low- and moderate-income families and individuals or collecting
penalties on larger employers that do not offer coverage. Compare Timothy
Jost, Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges Are Consistent with the
Affordable Care Act’s Language and History, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 18,
2012,
7:27
PM),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/07/18/tax-credits-infederally-facilitated-exchanges-are-consistent-with-the-affordable-care-actslanguage-and-history/ (arguing that nothing in the Act bars subsidies and
penalties in federally facilitated Marketplaces), with Michael Cannon &
Jonathan Adler, The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the
PPACA: A Response to Timothy Jost, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 1, 2012, 10:52
AM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/08/01/the-illegal-irs-rule-to-expand-taxcredits-under-the-ppaca-a-response-to-timothy-jost/ (responding to Professor
Jost’s arguments).
15. Sarah Kliff, Yes, the 37th Obamacare Repeal Vote Matters, WASH.
POST WONKBLOG (May 16, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/16/yes-the-37th-obamacare-repeal-vote-matters/
(arguing that each repeal vote has helped fuel uncertainty and further popular
resistance to implementation).
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against the social, political, economic, and moral interests of
their own populations.16
For better or worse, cooperative federalism is the platform
on which the Affordable Care Act rests. For this reason,
mending the federalism relationship, or at least building a
compensatory
legislative
structure
to
overcome
its
shortcomings if détente fails, has become vital. It is important
to think about what such an alternative arrangement might
look like even if, at the moment, it appears that prospects for
any federal legislative intervention are dim at best.17 One can
only hope.
In the spirit of hoping for a chance at further legislative
reform if the marriage cannot be saved, I take a closer look at
the two federalism relationships—one regulatory, the other
investment—that lie at the heart of the Act. I surmise that
even if sputtering and fragile, the regulatory partnership
actually is built to weather current conditions and that
ultimately, it will enable full implementation of the market
reforms that the Act sets in motion.
I also conclude, however, that at least where coverage of
poor adults and their families is concerned, the Medicaid
relationship is sufficiently under water to necessitate a federal
fallback system, comparable in spirit to the federal fallback
that has been designed for the regulatory side of the ledger.
Creating such a fallback is essential if the nation is to avert the
terrible spectacle of allowing any individual state to exclude its
poorest residents from coverage. Of course, we have been down
this road before; it took states many years after Medicaid’s
1965 enactment to implement the program fully. Indeed,

16. See, e.g., Elise Viebeck, Perry Doubles Down Against ObamaCare’s
Medicaid Expansion, The HILL (Apr. 1, 2013, 6:10 PM), http://thehill.com/
blogs/healthwatch/medicaid/291257-perry-doubles-down-against-medicaidexpansion (reporting on the Governor’s April 2013 press conference
announcing his opposition despite the enormous gains to Texas). At the press
conference, a number of high-ranking federal officials joined him, most
notably, Senator Ted Cruz, perhaps the most outspoken opponent of the Act in
the United States Senate at the time of this writing and a leader of the Tea
Party movement. Id. Viebeck, having talked with colleagues in Texas, noted
that during the press conference, Governor Perry was absolutely flanked by
prominent Republicans and looked as though he was being held-up. Id.
17. See Jonathan Weisman & Robert Pear, Partisan Gridlock Thwarts
Effort to Alter Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2013, at A1.
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Arizona did not implement Medicaid until 1982.18 One might
argue that in the name of federalism the nation should
continue to take this long view and nudge states into coming
around through an array of incentives.
But I argue here that what may have been tolerable in
Medicaid’s early years—when the entire health insurance
system was still evolving and our understanding of the role of
health insurance in access to care was so much more limited—
is no longer tolerable in 2013 when we stand on the precipice of
seeing millions shut out of coverage under health reform. To
allow one, a handful, or two dozen states to lock the poor out of
coverage in the name of federalism is simply unthinkable,
especially now that the nation has managed to build a viable,
alternative mechanism for extending near-universal affordable
coverage to the population. In 1965 there was no viable,
alternative pathway to achieving affordable coverage for
uninsured, low-income individuals. Now there is.
The Court’s Medicaid ruling in NFIB19 can be thought of as
having launched one of the most sobering federalism
experiments the nation has yet undertaken. But we need to
collectively call the social experiment to a halt now, just as
researchers presumably would do in the case of any
fundamentally unethical research design. One could argue that
the decision allows the country to test the practical
consequences of constitutional federalism, to determine
whether large financial incentives (memorably described by
Justice Kagan as “a boatload” of federal funds during the NFIB
oral argument)20 are sufficient to overcome regional,

18. Erick Eckholm, Late Starter in Medicaid, Arizona Shows the Way,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991, at A1.
19. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
20. For Justice Kagan’s memorable characterization of the Act’s Medicaid
eligibility expansion funding levels during oral argument on March 28, 2012,
see Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Florida et al. v. Dep’t. of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11400.pdf. Clearly, this was not enough for her to vote with the dissent on this
issue. Indeed, Medicaid’s sheer size, and the states’ high dependence on the
program, became a crucial aspect of the majority opinion finding that the 2014
adult expansion constituted an unconstitutional coercion. See Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After
NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 873–76, 906, 912–16 (2013) (discussing the
conditions under which a federal law conceivably could result in
unconstitutional coercion, including the size of federal funding involved,
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philosophical, and cultural differences about the federal-state
relationship. But this is not a question that is worthy of answer
in a just society. It is too late in our ethical evolution even to
ask questions such as the one that effectively has been posed in
the wake of the decision. The notion of testing the full
consequences of constitutional federalism pales when compared
to the broader public interest in promoting population health
and social justice. The states that, as of mid-2013, are on the
road to excluding the poor account for more than half of all
uninsured people in the United States.21
II. THE ACT’S DELICATE FEDERAL-STATE REGULATORY
PARTNERSHIP
In many respects, the basic approach to the regulation of
health insurance in the United States remains undisturbed
under the Act. Indeed, the Act builds on a pre-existing
federalism framework. It is true that where ERISA-governed
health plans are concerned,22 federal law continues to displace
state insurance regulation in the case of self-insured plans and
to completely preempt state law remedies generally, regardless
of the insured status of ERISA health benefit plans.23
At the same time, the ACA preserves the partnering
structure codified under the McCarran-Ferguson Act,24 while
considerably ramping-up the level of federal intervention into
the business of insurance regulation.25 This ramped-up
changing the terms of cooperating in an “entrenched” federal program, and
attempting to tie separate programs into a package deal).
21. Robert Pear, States’ Policies on Health Care Exclude Poorest, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2013, at A1.
22. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
governs health plans sponsored by private employers other than churches. 29
U.S.C. § 1002 (2012).
23. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004); Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47–57 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739–40 (1985). For a discussion of ERISA,
preemption of state insurance and other laws, and the ACA, see SARA
ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM chs. 8, 21
(2d ed. 2012).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012) (declaring that states have power to
regulate and tax the “business of insurance” where Congress has been silent).
25. See Sara Rosenbaum, Realigning the Social Order: The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act and the U.S. Health Insurance System, 7 J.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 28 (2011) (“The Affordable Care Act changes
these federal-state dynamics to a considerable degree. In the private health
insurance market, the federal presence is much more heavily felt. Although
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intervention is, of course, what is set to pack such an insurance
market punch beginning in 2014.26 The Act accomplishes its
objectives by amending a series of pre-existing—and relatively
limited—federal regulatory standards added to the Public
Health Service Act in 1996 by the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA).27 Furthermore, in recognition
of the imperviousness of self-insured plans to state insurance
laws, the ACA carries many of its Public Health Service Act
provisions over to ERISA itself,28 thereby ensuring their
application to both fully-insured and self-insured ERISA plans.
Yet even as the ACA introduces powerful structural
reforms into the legal fabric of insurance regulation, it also
retains HIPAA’s previous deferential approach to shared
enforcement responsibilities.29 As has been the case with the
Congressional approach to insurance regulation since the
enactment of McCarran-Ferguson,30 the ACA, like its HIPAA
predecessor, adopts a highly interstitial approach to the

states maintain their primary regulatory function and can maintain both
Exchange and non-Exchange markets, the Act fundamentally alters the
federal-state relationship by creating a federal framework for the regulation of
health insurance.”).
26. See Sara Rosenbaum, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act:
Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 130,
130 (2011) (“Full implementation occurs on January 1, 2014, when the
individual and employer responsibility provisions take effect, state health
insurance Exchanges begin to operate, the Medicaid expansions take effect,
and the individual and small-employer group subsidies begin to flow.”).
27. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (amending the Public Health Service Act). See
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (amending the Public Health Service Act).
28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1562(e), 124 Stat. at 270.
29. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act sec. 102,
§ 2722, 110 Stat. at 1968 (“[E]ach State may require that health insurance
issuers that issue, sell, renew, or offer health insurance coverage in the State
in the small or large group markets meet the requirement of this part with
respect to such issuers.”).
30. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012); see
Stephanie Kanwit, The Purchase of Insurance Across State Lines in the
Individual Market, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 152, 154 (2009) (“The Act had two
aims: (1) to re-affirm the role of the states as the primary regulators of the
insurance industry while preserving federal authority to regulate insurance
through “specific” enactments; and (2) to provide limited federal antitrust
immunity for the insurance industry.”).
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exercise of federal powers and maintains states in the
leadership position.31
Even a brief recitation of the key ACA reforms makes clear
that the Act’s substantive intervention into health insurance
regulation—the quid pro quo for the law’s personal
responsibility requirement and its attendant penalties32—is so
sweeping as to fundamentally alter the character of stateregulated health insurance products. This is especially true in
the case of products sold in the individual and small-group
markets, whether inside or outside the new Health Insurance
Marketplaces.33 The most salient reforms tend to involve access
to coverage, but the law also contains important modifications
of coverage design, particularly where individual and smallgroup products are concerned.34 The general reforms applicable
to all markets—large, small, fully-insured, and self-insured—
are as follows: a prohibition of discriminatory health insurance
rates other than those permissible under a modified community
rating system;35 guaranteed issuance of coverage36 and renewal
of policies;37 a ban against discrimination on the basis of health

31. See Rosenbaum, supra note 25, at 27–28 (“To be sure, ERISA, and to a
much lesser extent HIPAA, represented major departures from the principles
embodied in the McCarran Ferguson Act . . . . The Affordable Care Act
changes these federal-state dynamics to a considerable degree. In the private
health insurance market, the federal presence is much more heavily felt.”).
But see Christopher B. Serak, State Challenges to the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act: The Case for A New Federalist Jurisprudence, 9 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 311, 317 (2012) (“The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, while perhaps within the judicial exception to McCarran-Ferguson, will
eliminate the states’ monopoly over intrastate health insurance transactions
and severely limit the areas of insurance regulation over which the states
could still possibly enjoy the protections of McCarran-Ferguson. In effect, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act represents a near-total shift in the
locus of insurance regulation from the states to the federal government.”).
32. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 124 Stat. at
242–50.
33. See, e.g., infra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
34. Compare infra notes 35–51 and accompanying text, with infra notes
52–55 and accompanying text.
35. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act sec. 1201, § 2701, 124
Stat. at 155 (amending Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat.
682 (1944)). Section 1201 prohibits discrimination based on status as
individual versus family, geographic area, age, and tobacco use.
36. Sec. 1201, § 2702, 124 Stat. at 156.
37. Sec. 1201, § 2703, 124 Stat. at 156.
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status;38 a prohibition on excessive waiting periods;39 coverage
of routine health costs associated with participation in
approved clinical trials;40 a ban on annual and lifetime
coverage limits for most covered services;41 a prohibition on
rescissions of coverage except in cases of fraud;42 coverage of
certain recommended preventive health services;43 a
prohibition against the use of preexisting condition
exclusions;44 an extension of dependent coverage, when offered,
to age twenty-six;45 the use of uniform explanation of coverage
documents and standardized definitions;46 provision of certain
information to the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) Secretary;47 the use of quality rating systems;48
establishment of minimum medical-loss ratios and reporting
requirements for the cost of coverage;49 an expanded appeals
process including access to external appeals;50 and certain
patient protections related to emergency care, choice of health
care professional, and access to pediatric care.51
In the case of the individual and small-group market, the
Act goes a major step further by establishing specified coverage
parameters known as “essential health benefits.”52 These
“essential health benefits” consist of ten specified coverage
categories, along with specified cost-sharing and actuarial

38. § 2705, 124 Stat. at 156–60. An exception is carved-out for wellness
programs. Id. at 157.
39. Waiting periods exceeding ninety days are prohibited. Id. § 2708, 124
Stat. at 161.
40. Sec. 10103, § 2709, 124 Stat. at 892.
41. Sec. 1001, § 2711, 124 Stat. at 131.
42. Sec. 1001, § 2712, 124 Stat. at 131.
43. § 2713, 124 Stat. at 131–32.
44. Sec. 1201, § 2704, 124 Stat. at 154–55.
45. Sec. 1001, § 2714, 124 Stat. at 132.
46. § 2715, 124 Stat. at 132–35.
47. Sec. 10101, § 2715A, 124 Stat. at 844.
48. Sec. 1001, § 2717, 124 Stat. at 135–36. In a memorable qualifier,
Congress specified that the national quality rating system to be developed
must ensure “Protection of Second Amendment Gun Rights” in wellness and
prevention programs by limiting data collection to exclude information on
lawful gun ownership or use. Sec. 10101, § 2716(c), 124 Stat. at 884–85.
49. Sec. 10101, § 2718, 124 Stat. at 885–87.
50. Sec. 1001, § 2719, 124 Stat. at 137–38.
51. Sec. 10101, § 2719A, 124 Stat. at 888–91.
52. § 1302, 124 Stat. at 163–68.
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value rules.53 Furthermore, the essential health benefit statute
contains
an
unprecedented
statutory
ban
against
discrimination in the content of coverage on the basis of
disability54—a breakthrough in the regulation of health
insurance in the United States, although implemented timidly
thus far by the Obama Administration.55
These regulatory reforms are accompanied by the
establishment of a special Health Insurance Marketplace,
which combines the equivalent of an online shopping system for
certain subsets of the overall health insurance market (i.e.,
individual and small group plans)56 with a special regulatory
environment for overseeing the sale of federally-subsidized
insurance plans to this part of the market through a system of
advanced premium tax credits for individuals and tax credits
for small, low-wage employers.57 At their option, states may
operate their own Marketplace under broad federal direction
(known as state-based Marketplaces58) or elect to have the
53. Id. (“[S]uch benefits shall include at least the following general
categories . . . : (A) Ambulatory patient services. (B) Emergency services. (C)
Hospitalization. (D) Maternity and newborn care. (E) Mental health and
substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment. (F)
Prescription drugs. (G) Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices.
(H) Laboratory services. (I) Preventive and wellness services and chronic
disease management. (J) Pediatric services, including oral and vision care.”).
54. § 1302(b)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 163–68.
55. Despite the non-discrimination provision, the Obama Administration’s
final regulations governing essential health benefits virtually failed to do more
than simply repeat the language of the statute. For a discussion of the
weaknesses of the Administration’s implementation efforts in the area of nondiscrimination in coverage, see Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, A Lost
Opportunity for Persons with Disabilities? The Final Essential Health Benefit
Rule, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 11, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2013/03/11/a-lost-opportunity-for-persons-with-disabilities-the-finalessential-health-benefits-rule/.
56. See, e.g., What is the Health Insurance Marketplace?,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/what-is-the-health-insurancemarketplace (last visited Sept. 19, 2013) (providing a lay description of the
Marketplace).
57. The tax credit system is set forth at sections 1401 (individuals) and
1421 (small businesses) of the Affordable Care Act.
58. See State Health Insurance Marketplaces, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-andFAQs/state-marketplaces.html (last updated Oct. 1, 2013) (“States across the
country have received grants to establish a new marketplace. States can
create and operate their own marketplace (State-based Marketplace) or a
hybrid called a State Partnership Marketplace in which the state runs certain
functions. A Partnership Marketplace allows states to make key decisions and
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federal
government
operate
a
“federally-facilitated”
Marketplace either with or without a “State Partnership.”59
This conceptual approach to insurance reform—preserving
state primacy over health insurance regulation while
introducing transformational federal standards designed to
fundamentally remake the market at its core60—raises two
inevitable questions. First, how, exactly, do these
transformational reforms become integrated into state
regulatory enforcement machinery, since as noted, state
primacy is preserved? Second, what if state primacy fails either
because the state lacks the resources to carry out aggressive
insurance regulation or elects not to do so? Basic matters of
constitutional federalism simmer just below the surface of
these questions. In order to toe the constitutional line and
avoid a result that might be labeled commandeering,61
tailor the marketplace to local needs and market conditions. The Federal
government will establish and operate a marketplace in those states that do
not establish their own.”).
59. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers,
77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,325 (Mar. 27, 2012) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155,
156, and 157) (“In the Exchange establishment proposed rule, [the HHS]
introduced the concept of a Partnership model in which HHS and States work
together on the operation of an Exchange . . . . A Partnership Exchange would
be a variation of a Federally-facilitated Exchange. Section 1321(c) of the
Affordable Care Act establishes that if a State does not have an approved
Exchange, then HHS must establish an Exchange in that State; the statute
does not authorize divided authority or responsibility. This means that HHS
would have ultimate responsibility for and authority over the Partnership
Exchange. In a Partnership Exchange, we intend to provide opportunities for
a State to help operate the plan management function, some consumer
assistance functions, or both.”); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.100–.1328 (2012)
(explaining state options in establishing and managing exchanges).
60. See Rosenbaum, supra note 25, at 7–8 (“It is the states that regulate
the individual and group health insurance markets, and it is the states that
will be called upon to assure application of federal reforms to insured plans,
even as the federal government maintains primacy over the self-insured
market. It is the states that will bear primary responsibility for making
Exchanges work for individuals and small employers and for guaranteeing
that adverse selection against Exchanges does not undermine the ability to
grow insurance products that meet the needs of workers and their families
without access to employer coverage.”).
61. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925–33 (1997); see also
Matthew D. Adler, The Supreme Court’s Federalism: Real or Imagined? State
Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 158, 158 (2001) (“The anti-commandeering doctrine, recently
announced by the Supreme Court in New York v. United States and Printz v.
United States, prohibits the federal government from commandeering state
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Congress has developed an enforcement approach under which
the federal government is allowed to tread—but delicately—in
the face of state nonenforcement.62 The solution may be messy,
but conceptually it hangs together. To be sure, it probably will
be sorely tested under the Act’s far more aggressive federal
standards, but for the time being, the approach is at least
conceptually workable.
The ACA’s enforcement system preserves the 1996 HIPAA
approach, as codified in the Public Health Service Act,63
although regulations issued in 2012 take a slightly more
ambitious approach to articulating what could trigger the use
of federal fallback enforcement powers.64 Under the Public
Health Service Act approach, states remain the principal
enforcers, but the federal government positions itself to act if
all else fails. States have the option, in both the individual and
group markets, to decide whether they will take the
enforcement lead or defer to federal authority.65 Should a state
deliberately elect not to enforce the law, the HHS Secretary is
governments: more specifically, from imposing targeted, affirmative, coercive
duties upon state legislators or executive officials. This doctrine is best
understood as an external constraint upon congressional power—analogous to
the constraints set forth in the Bill of Rights—but one that lacks an explicit
textual basis.”).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 63–87.
63. See, e.g., HEALTH POLICY ALTS., INC., SUMMARY OF PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 34 (2010), available at
http://acscan.org/pdf/healthcare/implementation/PPACA-HPA-summary.pdf
(“If a state fails to establish an Exchange within 24 months of
enactment . . . the Secretary is required . . . to establish and operate an
Exchange within the state and to take actions to implement the other federal
requirements. Enforces federal authority related to non-electing states
through the HIPAA enforcement provisions of the PHS Act (newly designated
§ 2736(b)) without regard to any limitation on the application of those
provisions to group health plans.”).
64. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.101–.1328 (2012); see also § 155.105(f) (“If a State
is not an electing State under § 155.100(a) or an electing State does not have
an approved or conditionally approved Exchange by January 1, 2013, HHS
must (directly or through agreement with a not-for-profit entity) establish and
operate such Exchange within the State.”).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011) (“[E]ach State may require
that health insurance issuers that issue, sell, renew, or offer health insurance
coverage in the State in the individual or group market meet the requirements
of this part with respect to such issuers.”); Public Health Service Act, Pub. L.
No. 78-410, § 2723(a)(1), 58 Stat. 682 (1944), amended by Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Special
rules apply to the enforcement of federal laws to nonfederal governmental
health plans. See Public Health Service Act § 2724; 45 C.F.R. § 146.180 (2012).
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empowered to step in.66 Furthermore, the law enables the HHS
Secretary to intervene following a “determination . . . that a
state has failed to substantially enforce a provision” of federal
law related to “the issuance, sale, renewal, and offering of
health insurance coverage in connection with group health
plans or individual health insurance.”67 In other words, the
Secretary can intervene in one of two situations. In the first,
the state empowers intervention by informing her of its
decision not to enforce the law. In the second, she empowers
her own intervention by “determining” its necessity. This
mutuality of empowerment represents a complicated but
conceptually brilliant resolution to the constitutional problem
of federalism. Equality and deference are maintained. Yet the
law also allows for careful intervention.
Just how carefully the intervention has to proceed becomes
clearer the more the regulations are scrutinized. As noted, the
regulations provide for federal action in situations in which “a
State notifies [the federal government] that it has not enacted
legislation to enforce or that it is not otherwise enforcing”
federal market requirements.68 But the post-ACA regulations
enable federal intervention under certain triggering
circumstances, which range from the existence of a complaint
filed with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS),69 which has jurisdiction over the health insurance
market reforms,70 to news media reports71 and “any other
information” that suggests nonenforcement.72 Notably, the rule,
like the statute, contemplates no independent and affirmative
federal oversight system; that is, the federal government
expects to sit passively until some third party brings
66. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22(a)(2); Public Health Service Act § 2723(a)(2).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22(a)(2); Public Health Service Act § 2723(a)(2).
The Public Health Service Act also lays out the Secretary’s enforcement
authority as well as a federal enforcement process, which involves the
imposition of civil money penalties, as well as an extensive process of review
for determining liability. Id. § 2723(b). The authority to act on the issuer’s
license remains solely a matter for a state. Cf. GARY CLAXTON, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., HOW PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE WORKS: A PRIMER 7–8 (2002),
available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/howprivate-insurance-works-a-primer-report.pdf.
68. 45 C.F.R. § 150.203(a) (2012).
69. Id. § 150.205(a).
70. See id. § 150.101.
71. § 150.205(c).
72. § 150.205(f).
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nonenforcement to its attention.73 But at the point at which
evidence is received, the intervention machinery can begin to
work.
The process spelled out in the rule, even as revised postACA, remains almost painfully deferential to state powers. Not
only does the rule commit the federal government to wait for
third-party news of enforcement failure, but furthermore, the
federal intervention process begins with an assessment of
“whether the affected individual or entity has made reasonable
efforts to exhaust available State remedies.”74 In other words,
even when evidence of nonenforcement surfaces, the
regulations throw the matter back into the very state system
whose alleged failure is the subject of the third-party evidence.
Following this effort to accommodate a nonenforcing state,
the regulations spell out a lengthy consultative process as part
of complaint resolution,75 with an eye toward nudging a state
into action rather than immediately launching federalenforcement activities (which involve a lengthy investigation
and review process, followed by the imposition of civil money
penalties in cases in which liability is established76).77 The
delicate nature of the federal intervention underscores the
degree to which the federal government has sought to create an
environment in which CMS will step in only in the most
sustained and egregious situations—only after it determines
that a total breakdown in state enforcement truly has occurred.
And even then, it does so with an eye toward ultimately
negotiating a resolution that brings enforcement squarely back
under state control.
In keeping with this tentative and circumspect approach to
federal enforcement, CMS has gone to remarkable lengths to
hide even this carefully circumscribed machinery from public
view. Unlike the federal privacy rule, where HHS has taken a
73. See generally id. §§ 150.203–.205.
74. Id. §150.209.
75. The process involves notice to multiple state officials, thirty days for
an initial response by the state with the option to extend the response time, a
preliminary determination with more time granted to the state to show
substantial enforcement, and ultimately a final determination regarding
CMS’s intention to intervene in the enforcement process. Id. §§ 150.211–.221.
76. Id. §§ 150.301–.347.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22 (Supp. V 2011); Public Health Service Act, Pub.
L. No. 78-410, § 2723, 58 Stat. 682 (1944), amended by Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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relatively aggressive approach to publicizing its efforts to be
the leader in privacy protection,78 the tradition of insurance
regulation is tilted so strongly in the direction of the states79
that it is essentially impossible to find the entry point into the
federal default system. If one peruses the website of the Center
for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO),80
the insurance regulation arm of CMS, the site offers virtually
no information on how to file a complaint or bring potential
nonenforcement violations to federal attention. Instead, the
CCIIO website offers a lengthy explanation—simultaneously
legally meaningless and politically significant—about CCIIO’s
partnership with the states.81 The site does notify the public
about states that have formally notified CCIIO that they do not
intend to enforce the market reforms.82 But even in this
extreme situation, the agency does little to explain what the
federal government will do other than notify issuers that policy
forms must be sent to CMS for inspection and review. If a form
is found to depart from federal standards, “CMS will notify
issuers of any concerns . . . . and will also conduct targeted
market conduct examinations, as necessary, and respond to
consumer inquiries and complaints . . . .”83 If problems are
uncovered, CMS notes that it will “work cooperatively” with the

78. See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, Enforcement and Penalties
for Noncompliance, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
79. See Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good
Intentions: Problems and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
Under ERISA, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 29, 32–37 (1999).
80. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Compliance, CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/cciio/programs-andinitiatives/health-insurance-market-reforms/compliance.html (last visited
Sept. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Compliance].
81. Id. (“States and CMS have worked closely to ensure compliance with
the health insurance accountability and consumer protections in federal law.
The vast majority of states are enforcing the Affordable Care Act health
insurance market reforms. Some states lack the authority, the ability to
enforce these provisions, or both. CMS has responsibility for enforcing these
requirements in a state that is not enforcing the health insurance market
reforms either through a collaborative arrangement with the state or by direct
enforcement to ensure all residents of the state receive the protections of the
Affordable Care Act.”).
82. As of the end of March 2013, six states had done so: Arizona,
Alabama, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming. Id.
83. Id.
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state (the same state that notified CMS that it would not
enforce the law) to “ensure compliance.”84 CMS does not
explain how compliance will be ensured in a situation in which
a state, already having indicated that it will not enforce its
licensure laws in relation to federal standards, will somehow be
galvanized into action. Despite all of these limitations, it is
clear that should push come to shove, the federal government is
prepared to enforce the law if states fail to do so. As tentative
as the process might be, the fallback system erases any doubt
that the market reforms are nationwide in scope and leaves no
room for a state to opt-out of the reforms themselves, even if it
elects not to enforce the law or utterly fails to do so.85 The
presence of the federal fallback process also undoubtedly plays
at least some role in keeping the number of nonenforcing states
to a relative minimum. With the exception of the new Health
Insurance Marketplaces, where there may be many good
reasons to bring in the feds,86 most states place a high value on
their primacy in regulation of the insurance market.87 The
HIPAA federal fallback remedy, updated for the post-ACA legal
environment, creates a framework of national assurance.

84. Id.
85. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
86. A number of states undoubtedly have opted not to run their own
Marketplaces, at least in the initial implementation period, not because they
intend to sink the law, but because setting up the new online system is so
complex that they would prefer to have the federal government run it, at least
early on. Cf. Tracking the Progress of the Health Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/10/04/us/opening-week-of-healthexchanges.html?ref=health (last updated Oct. 26, 2013) (“Many of the
Affordable Care Act’s health exchanges have struggled with technological
problems since they opened on Oct. 1, though a few state-run exchanges have
fared better than others.”). I would assume that ten years from now, states
either will be running their Marketplaces or will be full partners with the
federal government.
87. Cf. Rosenbaum, supra note 25, at 27 (“Congress enacted the McCarran
Ferguson Act to clarify the states’ primacy where regulation of insurance is
concerned. To be sure, ERISA, and to a much lesser extent HIPAA,
represented major departures from the principles embodied in the McCarran
Ferguson Act. ERISA shields all health plans from major bodies of state law.
At the same time, states retain enormous discretion over the design and
performance of health insurance products sold in the individual and group
health markets.” (footnotes omitted)).
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III. THE ENDANGERED FEDERAL-STATE MEDICAID
RELATIONSHIP
At enactment, the ACA’s Medicaid provisions were on
track to add coverage by 2019 for an additional sixteen
million88 people beyond the sixty-five million already enrolled
in the program at the time of passage.89 Three years later, the
CBO had officially scaled back expectations to thirteen million
newly enrolled persons by 2023, a loss of some three million
persons.90 Even with these declining numbers, however,
coverage for millions of poor citizens hangs in the balance,91 as
the Court’s Medicaid ruling in NFIB has imperiled the future of
one of the principal legs of the four-legged stool—Medicaid,
Medicare, employer-sponsored coverage, and the revamped
individual insurance market—on which the post-reform
coverage system rests.

88. Leighton Ku, Explaining Recent Changes in CBO Projections of Health
Insurance Coverage and Costs Under the Affordable Care Act,
HEALTHREFORMGPS (June 5, 2013), http://healthreformgps.org/resources/
explaining-recent-changes-in-cbo-projections-of-health-insurance-coverageand-costs-under-the-affordable-care-act./.
89. MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND CHIP PROGRAM STATISTICS, MEDICAID &
CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION 6 tbl.2 (2013), https://docs.google.com/
viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=bWFjcGFjLmdvdnxtYWNwYWN8Z3g6NGQ5N
DI1NTliNTkwNzgzNg (showing Medicaid enrollment of over sixty-five million
in fiscal year 2010).
90. Jessica Banthin & Sarah Masi, CBO’s Estimate of the Net Budgetary
Impact of the Affordable Care Act’s Health Insurance Coverage Provisions Has
Not Changed Much Over Time, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (May 14, 2013),
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44176. The reasons for this scaled back impact
assessment are multiple and go beyond the legal free-fall created by the
Court’s Medicaid decision. For a clear explanation of the factors that have
caused the budgeting arm of Congress to change its estimates over time, see
Ku, supra note 88.
91. Recently-arrived legal U.S. residents who are not yet eligible for
Medicaid (which imposes a five-year waiting period for adults and an optional
waiting period for children) can go immediately into the Marketplace, even if
their family incomes are well below its 100% subsidy threshold. Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401(a), 124 Stat.
119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (amending IRC to include
§ 36B(c)(1)(B)). Thus, states that refuse to expand Medicaid punish only U.S.
citizens and long-term legal residents. As with the other arguments outlined
below, the argument of equity for U.S. citizens has fallen generally on deaf
ears in the resister states, but was highly persuasive in the case of the
Governors of Arizona and New Mexico, both of which have very large
immigrant populations.
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The 2014 adult-expansion group began, of course, as a
mandatory coverage group.92 Technically speaking, the group
remains mandatory, since in the majority opinion, the Chief
Justice was clear that nothing in its holding touched the
underlying terms of the expansion, but instead was limited to
the Secretary’s power to enforce those terms against states’
existing Medicaid programs.93 What is left is a coverage group
that remains technically mandatory but from which states can
opt out without fear of federal reprisal (other than the loss of
the funding that would have come with the expansion).94 But
rather than easing tensions, the decision has only made a bad
federal-state Medicaid relationship worse,95 transforming
defeat of the expansion into a clarion call for opponents of the
law.
Figure 1, which depicts state decisions related to the
Medicaid expansion and implementation of state Exchanges,
shows the state of affairs as of November 2013.96 The twentyfour states that had rejected the expansion as of this date could
fairly be characterized as the usual suspects: “red states” that
92. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001, amending Social
Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i).
93. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607
(2012) (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under
the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and
requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their
use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to
participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid
funding.”). For a full discussion of the decision, see Bagenstos, supra note 20;
Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and
Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U.
L. REV. 1 (2013); Sara Rosenbaum & Timothy M. Westmoreland, The Supreme
Court’s Surprising Decision on the Medicaid Expansion: How Will the Federal
Government and States Proceed?, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1663 (2012).
94. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (“What Congress is not free to do is to
penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking
away their existing Medicaid funding. Section 1396c gives the Secretary of
Health and Human Services the authority to do just that . . . . [T]he Secretary
cannot apply § 1396c to withdraw existing Medicaid funds for failure to
comply with the requirements set out in the expansion.”).
95. Lest people think that the Medicaid battle that engulfed the ACA is
some sort of anomaly, they need only read ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY
STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID
(1974), or the more recent account of Medicaid’s tumultuous history in DAVID
G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY: 1965–2007
(2008). The fight is always the same: money, state autonomy, and federal
power.
96. See infra note 103.
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served as the plaintiffs in the original Medicaid challenge to
the Act97 and whose political leaders (most,98 not necessarily
all) remain fully committed to total disruption of the law. Not
only are these states home to the majority of uninsured people
in the United States,99 but they also tend to be the states whose
populations are the most heavily disadvantaged in terms of
poverty and health status in the country.100 As the figure
shows, the rejecter states tend to be located in the Deep South
(or contiguous with it) and are home to enormous
concentrations of low income (and disproportionately minority)
residents who suffer the worst population health profiles in the
nation,101 including health conditions considered highly
amenable to proper medical care.102

97. See States’ Positions in the Affordable Care Act Case at the Supreme
Court, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/statepositions-on-aca-case/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) (“On March 23, 2010, the
state of Florida filed a lawsuit in federal district court challenging the
constitutionality of the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion
included in the Affordable Care Act. Florida was joined by 25 other
states . . . .”).
98. For example, after leading the charge against the Medicaid expansion,
Governor Rick Scott of Florida championed its adoption. He was bested by his
Republican legislature, which ignored his pleas and those of scores of
employer, health care, civic, and other organizations. See Sarah Kliff, Florida
Rejects Medicaid Expansion, Leaves 1 Million Uninsured, WASH. POST
WONKBLOG (May 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/05/05/florida-rejects-medicaid-expansion-leaves-1-3-millionuninsured/ (“Scott wouldn’t be the one to ‘deny Floridians’ a part of the health
care law—but the Florida legislature had other plans.”); see also Pear, supra
note 21 (“Several Republican governors, like Rick Scott in Florida, wanted to
expand Medicaid, but met resistance from state legislators.”).
99. Pear, supra note 21 (“More than half of all people without health
insurance live in states that are not planning to expand Medicaid.”).
100. See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Health
Disparities and Inequality Report—United States, 2011, 60 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 7 fig.4 (Supp. Jan. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6001.pdf (showing the “Gini Index” of
inequality in number of healthy days and average number of healthy days, by
state). Deep South states that have announced their rejection of the Medicaid
expansion or are leaning in that direction account for five of the bottom ten
ranked states. Other states leaning toward rejection of Medicaid expansion,
shown in Figure 1, make up most of the other bottom ten Gini states, with the
exception of Kentucky and West Virginia. Health problems in the South are so
serious that the region is identified in its entirety as a key focus of needed
progress. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT 2011,
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Figure 1103

For fifty years, as fraught as the federal-state Medicaid
relationship has been, it has somehow hung together. Indeed,
during periods of threat, such as proposals to block grant
Medicaid, states of all political stripes have tended to band
together with Medicaid’s federal supporters in order to stave-off
the imposition of arbitrary aggregate limits on federal Medicaid

at 2 (2012), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/
nhdr11/nhdr11.pdf.
102. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 101, at 1; see,
e.g., Medicaid Program: Initial Core Set of Health Care Quality Measures for
Medicaid-Eligible Adults, 77 Fed. Reg. 286 (Jan. 4, 2012). Pursuant to the
Affordable Care Act, the United States Department of Health and Human
Services has identified a “core set” of adult clinical quality measures that
emphasize treatments and interventions that can appropriately manage
serious and chronic health conditions in adults.
103. This map was created using a template found at Re: USA Interactive
Map Application, ANDYPOPE.INFO, http://www.andypope.info/ngs/ng12.htm
(last updated Apr. 28, 2007), and using data from State Decisions on Health
Insurance Marketplaces and the Medicaid Expansion, as of November
22, 2013, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/
state-decisions-for-creating-health-insurance-exchanges-and-expandingmedicaid/ (last updated Nov. 22, 2013).
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payments,104 even in cases in which states have been promised
the elimination of federal requirements in exchange for a cap
on payment.105
But the 2014 adult expansion turned out to be different, for
reasons that no one close to the process completely
understands. It would be easy to ascribe this latest round in
Medicaid wars to the uniquely terrible political situation in
which the nation finds itself engulfed. It is the case that, over
decades of Medicaid expansions, many of the program’s most
important champions have been federal and state Republican
leaders.106 Indeed, during the halcyon period of DemocraticRepublic cooperation in the early days of the ACA’s
development, staff on both sides considered setting Medicaid
coverage standards as high as twice the federal poverty level.107
This position was abandoned not because of the states, but
primarily because insurers themselves, who had insisted on
retaining a segmented Medicaid population for risk-avoidance
reasons, simultaneously objected to losing out on the just-

104. See, e.g., Bruce Lesley, Medicaid Block Grants: A Zombie Idea With
Lipstick in Texas, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2013, 5:06 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-lesley/medicaid-block-grantstexas_b_3044635.html (“Federal block grants are, by definition, an arbitrarily
capped amount of federal funding that go to states in the form of a lump sum
payment and fail to adjust for population growth, economic changes, public
health crises, or natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, etc.”).
105. States are wise, of course. Medicaid is the single largest source of
federal funding received by states. See VICTORIA WACHINO ET AL., HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FINANCING THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: THE MANY
ROLES OF FEDERAL AND STATE MATCHING FUNDS, at i (2004). As the Chief
Justice noted in NFIB, states are enormously dependent on its funding. While
state lawmakers always would appreciate solid funding with fewer
requirements, most realize that it is the very structure of the program that
justifies the financing arrangement. For a particularly insightful discussion of
this stressed and yet mutually beneficial relationship, see Alan Weil, There’s
Something About Medicaid, 22 HEALTH AFF. 13 (2003).
106. See DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND
POLICY, 1965–2007, at 170–71 (2008) (explaining that the reforms enacted
throughout the 1980s, which eventually added coverage of all low-income,
pregnant women and children under eighteen years, were the product of
consistent and political collaborations among Democrats in the House (chiefly
Henry Waxman and John Dingell), Senate Republicans (in particular,
Senators Durenberger and Chafee), and two Republican Presidents (Bush and
Reagan). However, even fine histories of the era, such as the cited book, do not
capture the extent of the collaboration.
107. See infra note 108.
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above-poverty market.108 Given the history of federal-state
relationships with years of grudging accommodation, the large
number of states eager to remove Medicaid’s historic exclusion
of most poor adults,109 and the highly favorable federal
contribution levels, which begin at 100% federal funding in
2014 and decline to 90% in 2020 and thereafter,110 people
basically assumed that the states would come around.
In the end, the catastrophe surrounding the Medicaid
expansion probably was the result of a combination of factors:
the viciousness of the political environment in which
everything can be sacrificed for the sake of scoring points; a
persistent and deep bias against aiding poor, uninsured adults
(it is not uncommon to find even the most sophisticated
reporters referring to the 2014 adult expansion group as “ablebodied,” a dog-whistle term, of course, for the undeserving
welfare poor);111 and conveniently, a legal theory—coercion—
whose very existence was in doubt in the minds of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit112 but that
seems to so aptly sum up the poisonous environment in which
the ACA is unfolding. In the end, the coercion doctrine
effectively emerged as the weapon of choice for releasing
decades of anger about Medicaid requirements and costs, longstanding prejudice against the poor, and capturing in a court of
law the extraordinary politics surrounding the Act and its
implementation.113

108. These observations are a result of my direct involvement in the
legislative discussions that led to the Act.
109. See, e.g., SAMANTHA ARTIGA, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, THE ROLE OF SECTION 1115 WAIVERS IN MEDICAID AND CHIP:
LOOKING FORWARD AND LOOKING BACK 5 (2009), available at
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/provgovpart/Documents/Waiver%20Renewal/The%20R
ole%20of%20Section%201118%20Waivers_Mar2009.pdf (discussing different
demonstration waiver programs under Medicaid). For example, the George W.
Bush Administration established Health Insurance Flexibility and
Accountability (HIFA) waivers, special demonstration programs under section
1115 of the Social Security Act, which permitted states to expand coverage to
impoverished, but otherwise ineligible, low-income adults. See id. at 6–9.
110. See About Medicaid, FAMILIESUSA, http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/
medicaid/about-medicaid.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
111. Pear, supra note 21, at A1.
112. See Florida ex. rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1265–67 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing the court’s
skepticism of the doctrine of coercion).
113. Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 93, at 1671.
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Whatever its causes, NFIB set off a year-long desperate
effort to convince the very states that sued to block the law’s
implementation to make a 180-degree turn and accept the
expansion.114 This odyssey, which will unfold in 2013 and
beyond, actually began with a preliminary skirmish in which
the states that had sued to block the expansion attempted to
stake out new ground that went beyond the decision itself.115 In
trying to position themselves on this new ground, the states
argued that the Supreme Court actually had altered the terms
of the expansion statute itself, creating a series of state options
where previously there had been only a single coverage group
tied to enhanced funding.116
Eager for the federal funds, states argued that the impact
of the decision was to create a partial implementation option
(e.g., coverage up to 100% of the federal poverty level, or 50% or
whatever percentage a state might choose) at highly favorable
federal financial participation rates.117 That the states’ position
was erroneous was clear from the plain terms of the decision.118
But even had the law been sufficiently ambiguous to afford the
Secretary some running room to offer a more expansive
interpretation of its meaning, there was widespread skepticism
over whether allowing states to select the expansion point of
their choice would have done any good as a practical matter.119
States that selected less than all the people in the Medicaid
expansion group—persons with family incomes up to 138% of
the federal poverty level—might have chosen to cap Medicaid
at 100% of poverty, the point at which the Marketplace
subsidies actually begin.120 But once state flexibility was
114. Id. at 1668–71.
115. Id. at 1667–70.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1669–70.
118. Id. at 1668–70 (discussing the decision and the Court’s explanation of
what it was and was not doing in relation to the Medicaid statute itself).
119. See, e.g., Pear, supra note 21, at A1.
120. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The fact that the subsidies can commence at
100% of poverty does not alter the fact that Medicaid eligibility, under §1401,
bars the receipt of subsidies. See also Sara Rosenbaum, Update: The IRS’
Final Shared Responsibility Regulations: When Does Medicaid Eligibility
Amount to “Minimum Essential Coverage”?, HEALTHREFORMGPS (Sept. 4,
2013), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/update-the-irs-final-sharedresponsibility-regulations-when-does-medicaid-eligibility-amount-tominimum-essential-coverage/ (discussing the fact that because the subsidies
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granted, there would be no legally logical stopping point, and it
was anything but clear that any more states would agree to
coverage up to 100% of poverty.121 This speculation about what
might or might not happen were the Secretary to allow states
to exercise coverage flexibility within the 2014 expansion group
did not matter in any event, because the Court could not have
been clearer: its decision did not alter the terms of the
expansion population, and therefore could not have given the
Secretary the authority to rewrite the legislation.122 It merely
barred the Secretary’s power to withhold current funding from
states that refused to adopt it.123
With the prospect of partial expansion officially off the
table as the result of Administration policies released in
2012,124 state legislatures returned in 2013 to an absolutely
extraordinary atmosphere in which the all-or-nothing question
of Medicaid expansion was debated in dozens of states.125
Legislative sessions in many resister states faced enormous
efforts by large stakeholder coalitions in support of
can commence at 100% of poverty does not alter the fact that Medicaid
eligibility bars the receipt of subsidies). The ineligibility of persons with other
forms of coverage to qualify for premium subsidies represents an attempt on
Congress’s part to ensure that persons with other forms of coverage would
drop their coverage in order to purchase direct coverage through the
exchanges instead.
121. Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 93, at 1669.
122. See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2607 (2012) (“This is not to say, as the joint dissent suggests, that we are
‘rewriting the Medicaid Expansion.’ Instead, we determine, first, that § 1396c
is unconstitutional when applied to withdraw existing Medicaid funds from
States that decline to comply with the expansion. We then follow Congress’s
explicit textual instruction to leave unaffected ‘the remainder of the chapter,
and the application of [the challenged] provision to other persons or
circumstances.’” (internal citations omitted)).
123. Id.
124. The Secretary quietly announced her decision in a set of “frequently
asked questions” (#26) issued December 10, 2012. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS ON EXCHANGES, MARKET REFORMS AND MEDICAID 11 (2012)
ASKED
QUESTIONS],
available
at
[hereinafter
FREQUENTLY
http://www.tota.org/Files/CMS_FAQ.pdf.
125. See, e.g., State Legislatures Debate Medicaid Expansion, PATIENT
PROTECTION & AFFORDABLE CARE ACT STATE ACTION NEWSL. (Nat’l
Conference of State Legislatures, Denver, Colo.), Feb. 8, 2013, at 1. Debates
are ongoing as of Fall 2013. Several States Still Facing Debates About
Medicaid Expansion, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2013/September/12/medicaidexpansion-issues.aspx.
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expansion126: the health care industry (especially hospitals that
treat large numbers of low-income patients and stand to lose
tens of billions of dollars in the coming decade in federal
Medicare and Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH)
payments);127 churches and religious organizations;128
consumer advocates and voluntary organizations;129 and most
low-wage
notably,
perhaps,
employers130—particularly,
126. See, e.g., Elizabeth Crisp, Push for Medicaid Expansion Continues
LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH
(June
10,
2013),
Beyond
Session,
ST.
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/article_e17f5e9e-8b5d5b63-8868-ee10ec8ccada.html#.UbXz1GKGK34.twitter;
Mike
Dennison,
Coalition Plans Voter Initiative to Expand Montana Medicaid Coverage,
MISSOULIAN (June 26, 2013, 10:35 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/state-andregional/coalition-plans-voter-initiative-to-expand-montana-medicaidcoverage/article_c1aa0dd2-de7d-11e2-8a68-0019bb2963f4.html; Mary Ellen
Klas, Big Business Coalitions: Failure to Expand Medicaid Hurts Business,
HERALD
BLOG
(June
19,
2013,
5:06
PM),
MIAMI
http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2013/06/big-business-coalitionsfailure-to-expand-medicaid-hurts-business.html.
127. Medicaid Program, State Disproportionate Share Hospital Allotment
Reductions, 78 Fed. Reg. 28,551, 28,552 (proposed May 15, 2013) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F) (2006 &
Supp. V 2011). The DSH cuts are considerable and are slated to take effect
despite the fact that many states will not have expanded Medicaid; the cuts
were, of course, predicated on the expansion. Corey Davis, Q and A:
Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments and the Medicaid Expansion,
NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, 6 (July 2012), http://www.apha.org/NR/
rdonlyres/328D24F3-9C75-4CC5-9494-7F1532EE828A/0/NHELP_DSH_
QA_final.pdf. In the spring of 2013, the Administration attempted to mitigate
these effects somewhat in proposed regulations. Medicaid Program; State
Disproportionate Share Hospital Allotment Reductions, 78 Fed. Reg. at
28,566; Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 27,486, 27,504–05 (proposed May 10,
2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 482, 485, and 489). Whatever
softening might be feasible within the confines of the legislative formulas to be
applied, it is obvious that the loss of DSH funding will prove especially
harmful to hospitals treating large numbers of low-income persons in states
that do not expand Medicaid. See Davis, supra note 127, at 6. Together, the
two reductions are expected to result in more than $36 billion in losses to
these hospitals between 2010 and 2019, and because the reductions are
permanent, the losses will continue indefinitely. Id. (providing a helpful
overview of the two DSH programs and the potential impact of the cuts).
128. See, e.g., JoAnne Viviano, Religious Groups Push for Kasich’s
Medicaid Expansion, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 4, 2013, 10:31 AM),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/03/04/religious-groupspush-for-kasichs-medicaid-expansion.html.
129. See, e.g., About the Alliance, OHIO ALLIANCE HEALTH
TRANSFORMATION, http://ohiomedicaidalliance.org/about_the_alliance (last
visited Oct. 5, 2013).
130. See, e.g., Scott Powers, Business Groups Say Expanding Medicaid
Would Save Them Money, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 19, 2013,

2014]

CAN THIS MARRIAGE BE SAVED?

193

employers unable to afford health plans for their employees
whose workers would qualify for Medicaid coverage.131 The only
force arrayed on the other side of this fight virtually
everywhere it was being waged was ideology.
That the expansion arguments have been so one-sided is
inevitable in light of the utter absence of any factual basis for
turning it down. Indeed, the evidence in favor of the expansion
is overwhelming.132 Moreover, that state resistance was not
based in fact becomes clear from even a cursory perusal of the
materials used in the legislative sessions. Even a cursory
review of studies from leading research organizations such as
the Urban Institute and the Rand Corporation, as well as statespecific studies gauging the economic impact of expansion,
illustrates the overwhelming consensus among researchers
regarding the bottom-line economic gains to states flowing from
the Medicaid expansion, as well as the significant losses that
states can be expected to experience as a result of not
expanding.133
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-06-19/news/os-business-pushesmedicaid-expansion-20130619_1_medicaid-expansion-expansion-plan-charitycare.
131. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 253 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (amending the
IRC to include a “shared responsibility for employers” section, also known as
“play or pay”). Larger employers that do not offer coverage face tax penalties if
their workers purchase subsidized coverage through the Marketplace, but
they face no similar penalty if their workers enroll in Medicaid. Id. The
“shared responsibility” provision will take effect on January 1, 2015. See
Shared
Responsibility
Requirements,
HEALTHCOVERAGEGUIDE.ORG,
http://healthcoverageguide.org/affordable-care-act/shared-responsibilityrequirements/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
132. See,
e.g.,
Medicaid
Expansion
Center,
FAMILIESUSA,
http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/medicaid/expansion-center/ (under “Tools to
Make the Case for State Expansion”) (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
133. See, e.g., JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE COST OF
NOT EXPANDING MEDICAID (2013), available at http://kff.org/medicaid/
report/the-cost-of-not-expanding-medicaid/; Carter C. Price & Christine
Eibner, For States That Opt out of Medicaid Expansion: 3.6 Million Fewer
Insured and $8.4 Billion Less in Federal Payments, HEALTH AFF., June 2013,
at 1030; Carter C. Price, Quick Takes: The Math of Medicaid Expansion,
RAND CORP. (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/10/quick-takesthe-math-of-medicaid-expansion.html. Various cost impact studies of the
decision to opt out of the Medicaid expansion, a wealth of studies of the
various economic benefits of expansion, and state-specific studies on the
economic effects of the expansion can be found in a special website maintained
by
Families
USA.
Medicaid
Expansion
Center,
FAMILIESUSA,
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These national studies, as well as the array of specially
commissioned reports on the economic impact of the Medicaid
expansion that have been prepared for specific states,134
document the economic effects of expansion, ranging from its
infusion of tens of billions of dollars in revenue into struggling
state and local economies135 to the assistance that expansion
would provide to struggling small low-wage employers136 and
the property and other tax relief it would provide to strapped
local economies bending under the weight of indigent health
care costs.137
With respect to the Medicaid expansion economic impact
analyses, no study has been more important than a special
analysis conducted by John Holahan and colleagues in fall 2012
for the Kaiser Family Foundation,138 whose central finding is
captured in Figure 2, below.139 This analysis demonstrates that
if all states were to collectively reject the Medicaid expansion,
they would spend $8 billion less over the 2013–2022 timeperiod than would be spent collectively were all states to adopt
the expansion.140 This conclusion rests on several factors: the
heavily enhanced federal funding; the effects of the expansion
http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/medicaid/expansion-center/ (last visited
Nov. 12, 2013).
134. These reports and studies can be reviewed at a special website
maintained by Families USA, under “Tools to Make the Case for a State
http://
Expansion,”
Medicaid
Expansion
Center,
FAMILIESUSA,
www.familiesusa.org/issues/medicaid/expansion-center/ (last visited Sept. 13,
2013), and study collections by state can be viewed under “Resources from the
States, Medicaid Expansion Center, Resources from the States, FAMILIESUSA,
http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/medicaid/expansion-center/resources-fromthe-states.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
135. See, e.g., Medicaid Expansion, COVER GA., available at
http://healthyfuturega.org/pdfs/MedicaidPostcard_r4_web.pdf (last visited Oct.
5, 2013).
136. See, e.g., Steve Spires, Medicaid Expansion: An Opportunity to Invest
in Louisiana’s Workforce, LA. BUDGET PROJECT 1 (2012), available at
http://www.labudget.org/lbp/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Medicaid-expansionan-opportunity-to-invest.pdf?b467e680.
137. See, e.g., Andrea Kovach, Expanding Medicaid: The Choice is Clear,
SHRIVER BRIEF (July 10, 2012), http://www.theshriverbrief.org/2012/07/
articles/health-care-justice/expanding-medicaid-the-choice-is-clear/.
138. JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, THE COST AND COVERAGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACA MEDICAID
EXPANSION: NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 5 (2012), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8384.pdf.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1.
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on state revenues as funds flow into the economy and jobs; and
the expansion’s ability to offset, through insurance, previous
state and local expenditures on medically indigent care.141
Figure 2

There is, of course, no longer any basis for claiming that
health insurance does not matter. A virtual deluge of studies,
many captured in the briefs filed with the Court in NFIB,
documents that the uninsured have more limited access to care
and that being uninsured compromises health and life.142 Nor
is there any lingering dispute over the economic impact of the
uninsured on the health care system and those with
insurance.143 While the existence of enormous cost-shifting
across health care markets did not create a basis for regulating
individual conduct in the health insurance market according to

141. Id. at 5–7.
142. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2611–12
(2012).
143. Id.
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the NFIB majority,144 Congress considered its existence a
factual given, along with other evidence showing the economic
impact of the failure to extend insurance coverage to all
Americans.145
Neither is there any debate over the value of Medicaid,
despite the best efforts of its opponents to attack the program.
Medicaid is accused of being costly and ineffective in improving
health and health care.146 In fact, the program owes its size not
to excessive spending on the poor, but instead to the sheer
number of people it must insure and the costly nature of the
services it covers.147 As an insurer, Medicaid is a bargain, with
a price tag one third lower on an average annual per capita
basis than the same level of private insurance coverage, chiefly
because its provider payment rates are so low.148 Furthermore,
despite claims to the contrary, which themselves rest on flawed
research that fails to control for the health characteristics of
Medicaid beneficiaries or the point at which they are enrolled
in the program,149 a cascade of studies points in the direction of

144. Id. at 2590–93.
145. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1501(a)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 242 (2010), amended by Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(“Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health Service Act (as amended
by section 1201 of this Act), if there were no requirement, many individuals
would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care. By
significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together
with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and
broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums.”).
146. See, e.g., Weil, supra note 106, at 15.
147. John Holahan & Stacey McMorrow, Medicare and Medicaid Spending
Trends and the Deficit Debate, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 393, 394–95 (2012)
(explaining why Medicaid costs so much).
148. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, EXPANDING MEDICAID A
LESS COSTLY WAY TO COVER MORE LOW-INCOME UNINSURED THAN
EXPANDING PRIVATE INSURANCE 3 (June 26, 2008), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-26-08health.pdf (“Average medical costs paid by an
insurer on behalf of an adult Medicaid beneficiary would be 7
percent . . . greater on average, if the beneficiary were covered instead by
private insurance.”); CBO ESTIMATES, supra note 8, at 4–5 (showing that the
per capita difference between Medicaid and private premiums is $6000 versus
$9000).
149. See Austin Frakt et al., Our Flawed but Beneficial Medicaid Program,
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. e31(1), at e31(1)–(2) (2011) (demolishing arguments
made by some researchers that Medicaid is associated with poorer health
outcomes).
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Medicaid’s enormous and positive impact on health and health
care among the poor and medically vulnerable.150
Even as stakeholders sought to make the factual case for
expansion, the Administration searched throughout 2013 for
possible ways to navigate through the morass. Its first foray,
which appeared to persuade few, was to clarify that states
could opt out of the expansion, or in the alternative, adopt it
and drop coverage later.151 But treating the expansion as
temporary raises a host of practical and political difficulties
and does not seem to have factored into any state’s thinking.
Perhaps the most notable incentives the Administration
has dangled have consisted of two strategies. The first has been
a promise to consider state coverage and management
innovations (accomplished through demonstration waivers
under section 1115 of the Social Security Act)152 as part of an
overall expansion strategy.153 The Administration has quietly
signaled to states that it will consider reforms in benefit
design, cost-sharing, freedom of choice, and other aspects of
Medicaid administration (for both traditional low-income
groups such as parents and children, as well as newly eligible

150. For some of the most recent, and finest, reviews of Medicaid’s impact
on health, health care, and health care costs, see TERESA A. COUGHLIN ET AL.,
URBAN INST., ARE STATE MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS READY FOR
2014? A REVIEW OF EIGHT STATES 8–10 (2013), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2013/rwjf406305
(using national data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to assess the
impact of Medicaid on access, health care use, and financial protections for the
low income population); see also Katherine Baicker et al., The Oregon
Experiment—Effect of Medicaid on Clinical Outcomes, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1713, 1718–21 (2013) (finding reductions in depression, improvements in
protection against financial catastrophe, but not measurable short-term gains
in certain clinical measures of adult health); Benjamin D. Sommers et al.,
Mortality and Access to Care Among Adults After State Medicaid Expansions,
367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1025, 1029–33 (2012) (finding more generous adult
Medicaid eligibility levels associated with reduced mortality from preventable
causes).
151. Dylan Scott, CMS: States Could Adopt Medicaid Expansion, Then
Drop It, GOVERNING (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.governing.com/news/
federal/gov-cms-no-deadline-for-state-decisions-on-medicaid-expansion.html.
152. See generally ARTIGA, supra note 109 (explaining Affordable Care Act
§ 1115 Medicaid and CHIP waivers and recommending issues for the Obama
Administration to consider).
153. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET IN
BRIEF 84 (2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/budget/fy2014/fy-2014budget-in-brief.pdf.
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groups) as part of a state’s adult expansion initiative.154 This
approach, which opens the door potentially to slimmer benefits,
higher cost sharing, and greater use of structured managedcare arrangements, essentially signals to the states that the
Administration is ready to let them significantly restructure
Medicaid if the restructuring is carried out in the context of
expansion.155 The hope obviously is that with sufficient
“innovation,” the growth of the entitlement itself will be seen as
more palatable. Indeed, apart from demonstration innovation,
the Administration has sought to lure states into greater
support for Medicaid through other reforms aimed at granting
more leeway in the use of techniques, such as greater costsharing, to deter what is perceived as unnecessary or wasteful
spending.156
The strategy that unquestionably has received the most
attention has been one that actually makes use of a longstanding state option to use Medicaid funds to purchase private
health insurance, but that recast the option in the context of a
newly established individual insurance market environment.157
Under this strategy, the HHS Secretary has clarified that she
will make federal funding available to states that elect to enroll
some or all low-income beneficiaries into “qualified health
plans” (QHPs)158 sold in Health Insurance Marketplaces159

154. See generally ROBIN RUDOWITZ & LAURA SNYDER, KAISER COMM’N ON
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING IN MEDICAID
(2013),
available
at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/02/8416.pdf (describing the status of premiums and cost-sharing under
the AIA); see also Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs, and
Exchanges, 78 Fed. Reg. 4594, 4623–29 (Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 430, 431, 433, et al., 45 C.F.R pt. 155) (discussing the inclusion of
new groups and the states’ option to be flexible with the Act).
155. Cf. Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs, and Exchanges,
78 Fed. Reg. at 4629–30 (describing states’ flexibility in designing benefit
packages as part of Medicaid expansion).
156. See id. at 4675 (“We believe these proposed policies would encourage
less costly care and decreased use of unnecessary services, which may reduce
state and federal costs for the specified services.”); see also RUDOWITZ &
SNYDER, supra note 154 (discussing the proposed cost-sharing changes).
157. See Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Medicaid to Buy
Private Health Insurance—The Great New Experiment?, 369 NEW ENG. J.
MED.
7
(2013),
available
at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/
NEJMp1304170.
158. See
Glossary,
Qualified
Health
Plan,
HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/qualified-health-plan/ (last visited Oct. 5,
2013).
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rather than into traditional Medicaid coverage arrangements—
that is, standard fee-for-service coverage or Medicaid-managed
care plans.160
The availability of Medicaid financing to purchase
insurance for beneficiaries across all coverage groups is as old
as the Medicaid statute itself. The 1965 statute,161 in directing
the Secretary to make payments to states to support the cost of
medical assistance, defined allowable costs as including state
expenditures for both Medicare Part B premiums and “other
insurance premiums for medical or any other type of remedial
care or the cost thereof . . . ”162 Twenty-five years later,
Congress amended the statute to explicitly promote the use of
Medicaid to purchase employer-sponsored coverage where
available, to the extent that it is cost-effective to do so.163 In
enacting the employer amendments, Congress also recodified
and preserved states’ original broad authority to buy
insurance.164 Today, the definition of medical assistance itself
includes explicit permission to states to use federal funds to
purchase “other insurance premiums for medical or any other
type of remedial care or the cost thereof.”165
The language from these long-established Medicaid
provisions formed the basis for federal guidance issued in late
2012 clarifying the availability of federal funds for premium
assistance.166 The ostensible purpose of the guidance,
159. See generally ROBERT J. HILL ET AL., REED SMITH, ACA AFFORDABLE
INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS (2013), available at
http://www.healthindustrywashingtonwatch.com/uploads/file/Alert_Affordable
%20Ins%20Exchanges,%20Qualified%20Plans_03_14_2013.pdf (summarizing
the structure of the marketplace for qualified health plans).
160. See Rosenbaum & Sommers, supra note 157.
161. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(1965).
162. Id. § 1903(a)(1).
163. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 4402, 104 Stat. 1388 (adding section 1906 to the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1396e (2006)). In the employer-sponsored coverage context, the
federal government has defined cost-effective as shared premium costs
between states and employers. Social Security Act § 1906(e)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396e(e)(2) (“The term ‘cost-effective’ has the meaning given that term in
section 2105(c)(3)(A).”).
164. See generally Social Security Act Title XIX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v
(providing for grants to states for medical assistance programs).
165. Social Security Act § 1905(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006 & Supp. V
2011).
166. See FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 124, at 15–16.
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subsequently mirrored in federal regulations proposed in early
2013,167 was to offer states a mechanism for potentially
reducing health insurance “churn” between Medicaid and the
Marketplace, a problem that is estimated to affect some
twenty-eight million low-income adults and their families
annually as a result of minor fluctuations in household income
throughout the year.168 By purchasing QHP coverage, Medicaid
agencies could effectively stabilize enrollment in a coverage
arrangement that also serves as the source of coverage in the
event that income increases.
As it turned out, the availability of federal Medicaid
financing to support premium assistance through the purchase
of QHP enrollment had a sufficient ring of the new and sexy
about it to at least capture some states’ attention, especially
Arkansas.169 QHP enrollment into the individual market was
perceived as having the potential, in other words, to soften
opposition among state lawmakers who otherwise would refuse
the Medicaid expansion.170 Furthermore, the purchase of QHP
coverage from Marketplace plans has at least the potential to
help stabilize Marketplace risk pools since the population most
likely to experience churn is younger, low-income workers.171
From a practical point of view, buying QHP coverage
probably would differ very little from buying coverage from a
Medicaid-managed care plan offering “benchmark” coverage,
which consists of the same essential health benefits sold
through QHPs, with slightly more cost-sharing protection.172 At

167. Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs, and Exchanges, 78
Fed. Reg. 4594, 4624 (Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 430, 431,
433, et al., 45 C.F.R pt. 155) (describing proposed 42 C.F.R. § 435.1015
premium assistance programs).
168. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid’s Next Fifty Years: Aligning an Old
Program with the New Normal, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 329,
333–34 (2013); see also Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in
Health Reform: How Changes in Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth
Between Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30 HEALTH AFF. 228, 232 (2011).
169. See Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act: Premium Assistance,
MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-Guidance/Downloads/
FAQ-03-29-13-Premium-Assistance.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (discussing
Arkansas specifically in CMS’s Q&A).
170. Id.
171. See id. (discussing the characteristics of new enrollees).
172. See id.; Nat’l Council for Cmty. Behavioral Healthcare, Medicaid
Benchmark Benefits in Health Reform: Improvements and Exemptions,
http://homeless.samhsa.gov/ResourceFiles/
THENATIONALCOUNCIL.ORG,
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the same time, a QHP purchasing strategy would resolve a
problem confronting the fifteen states that still do not have a
well-developed Medicaid-managed care industry,173 namely,
what to do with millions of newly insured people who cannot
enroll into any organized care system with a functional
provider network in these states (indeed, Arkansas offers a
case in point174). Viewed in this way, a strategy of using
Medicaid as premium support for QHP enrollment resolves a
complex operational problem.175 Of course, it is not possible to
say how many issuers and their provider networks will be
willing to cross over and sell in the Medicaid market. But a
number of Medicaid-managed care companies appear to be
eager to move into the QHP market,176 and so the prospects for
multi-market plans may be decent in those states with
Medicaid managed care already in place. In states that have no
managed-care experience such as Arkansas, the potential for
market growth—assuming that the state focuses its premium
support on younger, healthier working populations—would
appear to be good.177
To further the use of premium support, the Administration
has clarified in guidance that its premium assistance policy is
intended for use in the case of beneficiaries who qualify for
Medicaid based on low family income rather than medical
frailty,178 and furthermore, that enrollment in private coverage
must be voluntary for beneficiaries unless the use of premium
assistance (a state option) is coupled with a time-limited,
Section 1115 compulsory-enrollment demonstration waiver.179
Proposed premium assistance regulations issued in January
Medicaid%20Benchmark%20Coverage%20Health%20Reform.pdf (last visited
Oct. 20, 2013).
173. COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 150, at 2 (“In 2010, all but 15 states had
comprehensive risk-based Medicaid managed care programs . . . .”).
174. Sarah Kliff, Arkansas’s Unusual Plan to Expand Medicaid, WASH.
POST WONKBLOG (Feb. 28, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/28/arkansass-different-plan-to-expand-medicaid/.
175. Cf. Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act: Premium Assistance, supra
note 169.
176. See COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 150, at 6 (“Many, but not all, of the
managed care health plans interviewed for this study suggested that they
would participate in their state’s Exchange.”).
177. Rosenbaum, supra note 168, at 344–45.
178. Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act: Premium Assistance, supra
note 169.
179. Id.
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2013 as part of a larger set of Medicaid regulations180 stipulate
four conditions on the use of Medicaid to finance premium
assistance in the context of the ACA,181 all of which are
intended to foster the integration of expanded Medicaid
coverage with Marketplace coverage in order to foster
alignment between two markets and reduce the potential for
inter-market churning.182 First, the insurance coverage must
be primary to Medicaid in terms of coverage, with Medicaid
acting as the primary payer only for items and services not
falling within the essential health-benefit package that all
QHP issuers must furnish.183 Second, because Medicaid
beneficiaries enrolled in private insurance nonetheless remain
Medicaid beneficiaries, states must continue to provide
beneficiaries with the full scope of Medicaid coverage for items
and services falling outside the essential health-benefit
package but covered under the state plan.184 Third, states must
adhere to Medicaid’s special cost-sharing protections, which are
more generous than those established for Marketplacesubsidized plans.185 Finally, and perhaps most significant from
an operational perspective, the proposed rule specifies that
“[t]he cost of purchasing such coverage, including
administrative expenditures and the costs of providing
wraparound benefits for items and services covered under the
Medicaid State Plan, but not covered under the individual
health plan, must be comparable to the cost of providing direct
coverage under the State plan.”186
Although states’ authority to use premium assistance is
clear, the Administration’s proposed premium assistance policy
raises a number of implementation issues.187 First, must health
plans purchased using a premium-support approach comply
with all federal and state requirements applicable to the
180. FFP for Premium Assistance for Plans in the Individual Market, 78
Fed. Reg. 4594, 4696 (proposed Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 435.1015).
181. Id. (disclosing the four conditions for financing premium assistance in
proposed 42 C.F.R. § 435.1015(a)(1)–(4)).
182. Rosenbaum, supra note 168, at 334.
183. See FFP for Premium Assistance for Plans in the Individual Market,
78 Fed. Reg. at 4696.
184. Id. (describing proposed § 435.1015(a)(2)).
185. Id. (describing proposed § 435.1015(a)(3)).
186. Id. (describing proposed § 435.1015(a)(4)).
187. See Rosenbaum, supra note 168, at 334.
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purchase of traditional managed-care plans?188 Although the
requirements applicable to Medicaid-managed care are similar,
they are not identical.189 Does a premium-support agreement
trigger the full complement of Medicaid conditions applicable to
managed care arrangements?
Second, how is the comparability of costs to be measured?
As noted, the CBO cost estimates make clear that covering
Medicaid beneficiaries through premium support will cost 50%
more than traditional coverage.190 The basis for this difference
is pretty obvious: if agencies buy insurance, they are paying
premiums. They also are buying into coverage arrangements
that tend to pay significantly higher provider fees.191 Given the
obviously higher costs associated with private insurance, it is
unclear how the comparability test can ever be satisfied. In
Arkansas’s case, the state has suggested that its providers
actually get paid by private insurers at rates not much higher
than Medicaid.192 The state also has attempted to calculate the
administrative savings that can be expected to flow from
reduced churning,193 but the level of savings that can be
achieved in relation to the added costs associated with
enrollment in private insurance is unclear. Furthermore, the
nominal costs associated with buying pricier coverage would
rise further if the purchase of QHP policies stabilizes coverage

188.
189.
190.
191.

See id. at 344–45.
See id.
See CBO ESTIMATES, supra note 8, at 4.
See AETNA, UNDERSTANDING HOW THE HEALTH INSURANCE
PROVIDERS FEE AND TRANSITIONAL REINSURANCE CONTRIBUTION WILL
AFFECT YOU 3–4 (2013), available at http://www.aetna.com/health-reformconnection/documents/Aetna_HIP_RC_Brochure_FINAL.pdf.
192. See Jay Hancock, The Arkansas Medicaid Model: What You Need to
Know About the ‘Private Option’, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 1, 2013),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2013/may/02/arkansas-medicaidprivate-option-faq.aspx; Kliff, supra note 174.
193. See MARYBETH MUSUMECI, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, MEDICAID EXPANSION THROUGH PREMIUM ASSISTANCE: KEY
ISSUES FOR BENEFICIARIES IN ARKANSAS’ SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION
WAIVER
PROPOSAL
6
(2013),
available
at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/8459-medicaidexpansion-through-premium-assistance.pdf (“Arkansas’ proposal states that it
seeks to alleviate coverage gaps and differences in benefits and provider
networks as individuals move back and forth between Medicaid and
Marketplace coverage due to changes in income.”).
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over time.194 Reduced churning improves coverage stability, but
eliminating the on-off quality of insurance could be expected to
result in additional costs.195 Over the 2014–2016 time period,
when the federal contribution is at 100%, the additional costs
associated with premium support would be borne fully by the
federal government in the case of newly eligible
beneficiaries.196 States would begin to incur costs after this
date.197 Moreover, to the extent that premium support is
extended to traditional low-income populations not covered by
the enhanced payment (e.g., low-income parents and their
minor children), the federal contribution would be at the
regular level, and the states’ share accordingly would be
higher.198 Whether these higher costs are enough to dissuade
states from attempting premium support remains an unknown.
Regardless of the questions raised by premium assistance, it
would seem obvious that the value of allowing states to move
forward in this fashion outweighs the challenges if the added
flexibility is sufficient to encourage states to adopt the
expansion.
IV. DISCUSSION
The future of the Affordable Care Act rests on the extent to
which two federalism relationships succeed. The first
relationship, codified in the Public Health Service Act,
establishes a regulatory partnership between the federal and
state governments that covers the health insurance industry as
a whole, as well as the special new Marketplaces for affordable
insurance.199 Clearly, this relationship is not without its
194. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1402, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
195. In the short term it is always less expensive to interrupt coverage for
weeks if not months, since during the interruption periods, insured services
are not consumed. During the health reform debate, annual enrollment
periods were considered and rejected for cost reasons. In 2013, legislation was
introduced by Representatives Green and Barton to enable states to use
annual enrollment periods. Stabilize Medicaid and CHIP Coverage Act, H.R.
1698, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013).
196. HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 36.
197. Id.
198. Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act: Premium Assistance, supra
note 169.
199. See generally Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg to 300gg–
28 (discussing requirements relating to health insurance coverage).
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complications, and its success turns on a delicate dance
between the partners over questions of standards and
enforcement.200 Despite the bumps and delicacy, the key value
of the relationship is that if the state partner fails, the federal
government is empowered to act, typically to nudge the state
partner into action, but if necessary, to assure that national
standards actually operate as national standards.201
The second partnership, codified in Medicaid, can be
thought of as a joint investment relationship. This relationship
is much more long-lived with decades of bumpiness, but it has
never hit quite the same level of rock bottom that has been
reached in half the states under the ACA. From the time of
Medicaid’s enactment it has been obvious that having to rely on
state choices for covering the poor creates real problems; by
their failure or refusal to invest, states had the power to
dramatically reduce the program’s reach and investment.202
Now, however, the problem has become critical. On
January 1, 2014, a transformational era in U.S. health policy is
set to begin when near-universal coverage is scheduled to
commence.203 At the rate things are going, the transformation
will be aborted in half of all states.204 In community after
community, outreach efforts will produce hundreds and
thousands of applicants who, given the realities of who is
uninsured, will be especially likely to have such low household
income that they will qualify for Medicaid.205 Indeed,
regardless of whether one uses the initial CBO coverage
projections or its more recent updated estimates, it is clear that

200. See id.
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22.
202. Cf. Rosenbaum, supra note 25, at 27–28 (“The federal Medicaid law
traditionally vests states with significant discretion over who will be covered,
what benefits will be provided, what providers will be allowed to participate in
the program, how providers will be regulated and paid for their services, and
how states’ plans will be administered. The majority of state Medicaid
expenditures are for services considered optional under federal law.”).
203. See KATIE KEITH ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: STATE ACTION ON THE 2014 MARKET REFORMS 1
(2013),
available
at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/
Publications/Issue%20Brief/2013/1662_Keith_implementing_ACA_state_actio
n_2014_reform_brief_v2.pdf.
204. Cf. id. at 5–8 (finding that thirty-nine states have yet to pass
legislation to implement the 2014 market reforms, though several states are
considering related legislation).
205. See Rosenbaum, supra note 168, at 330.
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Medicaid accounts for half of the entire new enrollment under
the law.206 States’ failure to adopt the expansions means that
in these communities, a sizable number of applicants promised
“no wrong door” (the parlance during health reform to signal
near-universal availability of coverage) will find their
applications rejected because they are too poor.207
In the absence of a miraculous turn-around between the
middle and the end of 2013, it is too late to hope for anything
other than stories of widespread coverage denials. No one
thought about a federal fallback, because federal policymakers
were convinced as a matter of law that none was needed. The
Supreme Court’s decision changed everything in this regard
and made it essential to think about fallback approaches,
assuming that future legislative reforms do become possible.
What might a federal Medicaid fallback look like?
Obviously, the fallback cannot involve the forced expenditure of
funds by states on behalf of the newly eligible population
without crossing the line into coercion. Nor can the fallback
involve simply improving the incentives. Even if the enhanced
federal funding were to be set at 100% permanently rather
than declining slightly over time,208 a heightened payment
would not suffice; in their cost estimates and court filings, state
officials have actively argued that the enhanced federalfinancing formula is inadequate in two respects.209 First, they
point out, the formula does not provide 100% contributions for
administrative costs associated with the expansion, which may
be considerable.210 Second, they note that the 100%
contribution rate does not apply to offset costs associated with
health reform’s “woodwork” effects, that is, costs associated
with covering individuals who would have qualified for
Medicaid under pre-expansion program rules and had never
applied for help but did so in 2014 as a result of expanded
206. See Ku, supra note 88.
207. See Ellie Sandmeyer, WSL Cherry-Picks Study to Attach Medicaid
Expansion, MEDIAMATTERS AM. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://mediamatters.org/print/
research/2013/10/09/wsj-cherry-picks-study-to-attack-medicaid-expan/196368.
208. See CBO ESTIMATES, supra note 8, at 9.
209. See STAN DORN, URBAN INST. HEALTH POLICY CTR , CONSIDERATIONS
IN ASSESSING STATE-SPECIFIC FISCAL EFFECTS OF THE ACA’S MEDICAID
EXPANSION 2 (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412628Considerations-in-Assessing-State-Specific-Fiscal-Effects-of-the-ACAsMedicaid-Expansion.pdf.
210. Id. at 2–3.
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outreach efforts.211 Whether these underestimates of the cost of
expansion are correct, the point is that simply increasing the
incentive for expansion is insufficient, not only because
additional costs may accrue but because so much of the
resistance now in evidence can be attributed to ideology devoid
of factual basis. The facts in this case simply do not explain the
behavior that is on display.
Fashioning a federal Medicaid fallback in a post-reform
world becomes far more feasible than previously, precisely
because the ACA builds a companion, subsidized individual
insurance market that is accessible regardless of health
status,212 has a mechanism for adjusting the cost of coverage by
family income,213 and offers a level of coverage that, although
not as enriched as Medicaid, is broad.214 Marketplace products
will cover a full range of preventive services without cost
sharing.215 Cost-sharing assistance will be available for other
covered items and services.216 And covered items and services
will be comparable to that found in the small-group market,
and special protections such as mental health parity and bans
against discrimination in coverage based on disability will
apply.217 To be sure, this level of coverage does not suffice for
211. Id. at 3. For a discussion of estimating the proportion of Medicaideligible children and adults who are not enrolled, see generally BEN SOMMERS
ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING PARTICIPATION
RATES IN MEDICAID: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2012),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2012/medicaidtakeup/ib.pdf.
Estimates are that only half of all Medicaid-eligible adults actually were
enrolled prior to the ACA, with state estimates ranging from 36% in
Mississippi to 81% in Massachusetts. Id. at 3.
212. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (prohibiting
preexisting condition exclusions).
213. See generally KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE
REFORM: QUESTIONS ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES (2012), available
at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7962-02.pdf
(describing scaled tax credits based on family income).
214. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302, 124 Stat.
at 163 (requiring coverage for essential health benefits).
215. Id. § 1001, 124 Stat. at 130 (amending PHSA section 2713 regarding
the coverage of preventive health services).
216. See, e.g., id. § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253 (providing for shared
responsibility for employers regarding health coverage and discussing cost
sharing).
217. Id. § 1302(b)(4)(D), 124 Stat. at 164 (“[T]he Secretary shall—ensure
that health benefits established as essential not be subject to denial to
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children and adults with serious, long-term health needs, but
the people most likely to be injured by the nonexpansion states
are, to a significant degree, very poor workers.218 Even
individuals with more advanced health needs would be
helped—although not as much as they might need—by
Marketplace products. Finally, because the ACA contains
provisions for risk adjustment across the insurance market in
order to ensure that adverse selection into qualified health
plans sold in the Marketplace does not sink it,219 using QHP
coverage as a fallback for the poorest individuals becomes even
more feasible.
Two models of the fallback might be considered. In the
first, the federal government would simply assume 100%
responsibility for all newly eligible individuals and enroll them
in qualified health plans. In the second, the federal government
could offer states the option of managing coverage for the
expansion group, just as they manage their state plans
generally, but reimburse states 100% permanently for costs
associated with this group. In this way, those states that do
wish to expand, as half have done, would continue to play the
primary role in coverage and administration. But as with the
Public Health Service Act, states that do not wish to administer
the coverage expansion could opt for federal administration,
just as states can opt for a federal Marketplace or federal
management of insurance reforms today.
Of course, nothing gets done in Washington by way of
investment if there is no source of financing. Two sources come
to mind to cover the cost of a complete federalization of the
expansion costs. One source might be a small reduction of
federal funds otherwise payable for current Medicaid programs.
While the federal government could not require states to pay
their own funds to add the new expansion group, there is no
reason, under coercion theory, why the federal government
could not slightly alter the terms of its current contribution to
state programs. The federal contribution to Medicaid

individuals against their wishes on the basis of the individuals’ . . . present or
predicted disability . . . .”).
218. See Michelle F. Cortez, Push Against Obamacare Leaves 5 Million
(Oct.
17,
2013,
11:01
PM),
Without
Coverage,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-17/push-against-obamacare-leaves-5million-without-coverage.html.
219. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1343, 124 Stat. at 212.
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constantly rises and falls as state circumstances change and as
broader economic conditions evolve. Since the federal
government has already committed to 90% federal contribution
to the expansion population in perpetuity, the reduction on
contributions to current state programs would be quite
modest.220
Another source of funding might be a further expansion of
the so-called “Cadillac tax,”221 that is, the additional tax that
will be paid by health plans considered to have excessive value
under the Act. Currently, the tax is set to hit plans, beginning
in 2018, with a value of $10,200 in the case of individual plans
and $27,500 in the case of family coverage.222 The tax threshold
could be lowered slightly in order to help offset the increment
necessary to increase federal financing for the newly eligible
group to 100%. Other possible sources of revenue might be a
slight increase in the medical device tax or a tax on insurers
themselves.
Perhaps states eventually will come around, especially
once they actually start to face the financial, social, and moral
consequences in 2014 of having excluded their own residents
from health reform. It is also true that the lack of a federal
fallback to compensate for low Medicaid coverage has always
been one of Medicaid’s most serious problems, and no solution
previously has been devised. However, health reform raises the
ante, not only by intensifying the pain of state choices but also
by creating the potential for a thoroughly workable fallback in
the event that states do not expand. We owe it to ourselves as a
nation, not to mention to the poor, to at least try.

220. See, e.g., Sandhya Somashekhar, GOP Governors’ Endorsements of
Medicaid Expansion Deepen Rifts Within Party, WASH. POST, June 3, 2013.
221. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 9001, 124 Stat. at
847 (imposing an excise tax on high cost employer-sponsored health coverage);
Reed Abelson, Bearing Down on Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2013, at
B1. There is some evidence to suggest that high value health plans already are
being scaled back in order to avoid the tax, so the value of increasing tax
liability might fade over time. Abelson, supra, at B1.
222. Abelson, supra note 221, at B1.
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